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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)(j). The case
was assigned to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Section 78-2-2(4) on or about August 16, 2005.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Appellant asserts the following issue on appeal:
Did the District Court error in ruling that even though Defendant refinanced a
purchase money security interest, the statutory provisions of Utah Code Annotated
Section 70A-9a-103(6)(c) somehow do not apply and as a consequence "[t]hat
Defendant's security interest in the collateral is junior to the priority secured position of
Plaintiff as a matter of law."
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT
The priority of the Defendant's refinanced purchase money security interest was
argued both by Memorandum and during the oral arguments of the hearing on summary
judgment. The Defendant also supported the Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9a103(6)(c) argument by submitting affidavit testimony and exhibits, including affidavits
indicating the intent of the refinancing parties to extend the purchase money priority and
the UCC-1 filing documents demonstrating that intent.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue of whether Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9a-103(6)(c) provides
purchase money security priority to a third party creditor who refinances a purchase
money security interest presents an issue of first impression of law. Issues of law are

1

subject to a correctness standard: Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41 (UT
2003);Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 1999 UT 37, 977 P.2d 1205 (UT 1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a dispute between creditors regarding the priorities of their
respective security interests. Defendant asserts a priority premised upon Utah Code Ann.
Section 70A-9-103(6)(c), which preserves purchase-money status upon purchase-money
debt that is refinanced. Plaintiff upon Motion for Summary Judgment successfully
asserted a nonpurchase money security priority premised upon (a) Plaintiffs filing of a
general security interest on all of the debtor's crops and equipment prior to the
Defendant's refinancing of the original purchase-money debt, and (b) the trial court's
ruling that the Defendant's refinanced debt cannot be traced to the outstanding balance of
the original purchase money debt within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated Rule
Section 70A-9-103(6)(c), which preserves purchase-money status upon purchase-money
debt that is refinanced.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
As a preface to this factual summary, the Defendant relies upon the well-established
rule: "When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, "we view the facts
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light of the nonmoving party.'"
Nolan v. Hoopiianina, 528 Utah Adv Rep. 15, 2005 UT App. 272, quoting Wayment v.
Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 2005 UT 25, 523 Utah Adv. Rep 39. As the court did in
Nolan, "We recite the facts of the case accordingly." Id.
On March 5, 1998, the Pali Brothers (the debtor) purchased two combines from
Case and financed them through New Holland Credit. New Holland filed a purchasemoney security interest on this purchase-money debt on 3/5/1998 (See attached Exhibit
2

1,2, 3, and 4, to PickrePs First Affidavit). This UCC filing constituted an original
purchase-money obligation. The parties agree the New Holland's purchase-money
security interest was entitled to a security priority to Plaintiffs security interest because
it both (a) predated the Plaintiffs nonpurchase money security interest in all the crops
and equipment of the debtor; and (b) constituted a valid purchase-money security interest
that was senior in status to Plaintiffs security interest regardless of the filing date.
On February 22, 2000 and again on February 26, 2001 Plaintiff (Lewiston State
Bank) filed a nonpurchase money security interest on all of the debtor's crops and
equipment. When Plaintiff filed these general security interests a substantial balance
remained on New Holland's senior purchase money security interest. Accordingly, in
extending debtor credit in 2000 and 2001, as a matter of financial reality Plaintiff could
not have relied upon the equity interest in the subject combines that is in dispute in this
case that can be traced to the outstanding balance on the New Holland debt.
In early 2002 the Pali Brothers became delinquent in their payments to New
Holland Credit on the purchase-money obligation for the disputed two combines. To
avoid default upon New Holland's purchase-money security interest, on February 20,
2002 the Pali Brothers as debtors negotiated a refinance of the outstanding balance of the
original purchase money debt, $67, 654.79, with the John Deere on behalf of Defendant
Greenline. According to the terms of their refinance agreement, the Defendant agreed to
pay the outstanding balance owed to New Holland on the combines of $67, 654.79
(Exhibit 10 of PickrePs First Affidavit), then refinance the same equipment for the same
outstanding balance with the Pali Brothers. The only essential difference between the
original purchase money debt and the refinanced debt was that the Defendant agreed to
(a) delay payments for a year to give the Pali Brothers a chance to recover from their
3

financial difficulties, and (b) refinance the same debt at a lesser interest rate.. (Exhibit 11
of Pickrel's First Affidavit: a four page Variable Rate Loan Contract and Security
Agreements between the debtor and the Defendant as refinancing creditor).

Prior to

completing the refinance transaction, Defendant requested a lien release from New
Holland for the combines (Paragraph 6 of Braegger's Affidavit).
In return for their more favorable refinance terms, the Pali Brothers as debtors
agreed to give the Defendant "a purchase money security interest in the combines in
connection with this purchase and resell." (Paragraph 4 of Pickrel's Second Affidavit).
The Defendant was well aware that the debtors were having financial difficulties in
making payments to New Holland on the purchase-money debt. According to the
Affidavit testimony of Defendant's Jay Pickrel, Defendant would not have refinanced the
combines without insuring that Defendant would have first priority lien. Indeed, Pickrel
testified that as store manager he would never finance equipment for anything
approaching "$70,000 without ensuring Greenline a first priority lien position such as a
purchase-money security interest." (Paragraph 4 of Pickrel's Third Affidavit). Melisa
Braegger as Defendant's office manager also testified that "Greenline would not have
purchased the two combines from the Pali Brothers and then financed them with John
Deere Credit if they did not believe they had a purchase money security interest in the
combines." (Paragraph 5 of the Braegger Affidavit).
The refinancing agreement between the debtor and the Defendant Greenline also
provided as the only "add-ons" to the amount of the original purchase-money debt would
b e ( l ) a $ 1 0 UCC filing fee to preserve the purchase-money status of the collateral being
refinanced, and (2) a $150 origination fee (Exhibit 11 to Pickrel's First Affidavit). On
March 6, 2002, within twenty days of the February 20, 2002 refinancing agreement
4

between the Pali Brothers as debtors and the Defendant as refinancing creditors, the
Defendant filed the agreed upon UCC purchase-money security interest, for which the
Pali Brothers had agreed to pay as a $10 "add-on." This agreement and filing was
intended to ensure that the refinanced collateral received the same purchase money
priority that the previous creditor, New Holland, was entitled to as the previous purchasemoney creditor (Exhibit 8, to PickrePs First Affidavit).
In connection with this refinance, the $67, 519.85 in refinanced debt can be
clearly traced to the outstanding amount of the original purchase-money debt of
$67,544.79. The $10,626,43 finance charge identified in the refinancing documents as
the potential total cost of refinancing the debt over the life of the loan, rather than being
an "add on," was less than the finance charges that would have been assessed under the
original New Holland debt obligation because the refinance agreement provided a lower
interest rate than the New Holland agreement (Exhibit 11 of PickrePs First Affidavit).
Also, even though the Plaintiff was aware that Defendant had refinanced the combines,
"Lewiston Bank made no claim on the combines when they were purchased from New
Holland and resold to the Pali Brothers under the March 6, 2002 purchase-money
security interest and at no time [following the refinancing] did Lewiston ever attempt to
take possession of the combines under what they claimed was a priority security
interest." (Paragraph 8 of PickrePs Third Affidavit).
As a consequence of Defendant's refinance of New Holland's purchase money
security, the Plaintiff was in the same secured situation they had been prior to the
transaction: their 2001 and 2002 general security interests in all crops and equipment
remained subordinate to the same amount of purchase-money priority in the exact same
collateral that they had been subordinated to prior to the refinance. The only differences
5

between New Holland financing and the Defendant's refinancing were: (1) the "addons" refinanced included a $150 origination fee and a $10 fee for filing the UCC
purchase money security interest; (2) the debtor Pali Brothers, who at the time of the
refinancing were delinquent in their payments on the combines to New Holland, obtained
a delay in making any payments for a year; and (3) the Defendant's total finance
exposure over the course of the loan, the $10,626.43 finance charge, was less than would
have been incurred had the New Holland financing agreement.
As a matter of economic reality, the Defendant's refinancing New Holland's
purchase-money obligation benefitted all the parties, including the Plaintiff, by (1)
removing an immediate default and repossession by New Holland Credit of the two
combines, (2) providing the Pali Brothers with additional time, resources, and lower
finance charges, and (3) providing the Plaintiff with the benefit of an additional year of
crops over which they held a security interest from the continued use of the combines.
Moreover, the extension of the purchase-money priority over the same debt did not
disadvantage the Plaintiffs security interest which had always been subordinated to the
New Holland purchase money security interest. The Plaintiff gained, rather than lost, as
a consequence of the the refinancing even with Defendant retaining purchase money
priority in the refinanced debt.
The Pali Brothers made no payments to Defendants under the refinancing
agreement, and defaulted when the first payment became due. The defendant
repossessed the combines, repaired them for resell, and sold the first combine on June
20, 2003 for $36,500 and the second combine for $41,500. This litigation followed
contesting the respective priorities of the two creditors with respect to the $78,000
received from the sale of the combines. The Plaintiff in this action, who furnished none
6

of the funds to either purchase or refinance the disputed two combines, claims a windfall
of the $78,000 they would not have been entitled to if the New Holland debt had not been
refinanced. They successfully argued in the summary judgment hearing that the
purchase-money priority New Holland enjoyed in the combines was "transformed" by
the refinancing into non-purchase-money debt, thereby justifying a windfall to them in
the amount of the refinanced debt contributed by Defendant. The Defendant claims
under Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9-103(6)(c) a refinance security priority only in
the amount that can be traced through their refinancing to the collateral that had been
subject to the original purchase-money security interest.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW
DEFENDANT GREENLINE, AS A NEW REFINANCING CREDITOR, IS NOT
ENTITLED TO PURCHASE MONEY PRIORITY UNDER UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 70A-9a-103(6)(c) OVER DEFENDANT'S NONPURCHASE
MONEY SECURITY INTEREST.
Several legal issues, as well as most factual issues, related to this dispute over
security priorities in this case are uncontested.
First, the original creditor, New Holland, prior to the refinancing of the subject
combines held a perfected purchase-money priority over Plaintiffs security interest
under Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-324. New Holland's security filing on March 5,
1998 held priority over Defendant's general security interests filed on February 22, 2000
and February 26, 2001, both because under Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-322 New
Holland security interest enjoyed a "priority in time of filing," and also a priority in
7

status by qualifying as a purchase-money security interest under Utah Code Annotated
70A-9a-103(l)(b). It is therefore uncontested that had the Pali Brothers defaulted to
New Holland when they began to suffer financial difficulties in early 2002, then
Plaintiffs general security claim would have been clearly subordinated to New Holland's
outstanding balance of $67,544.79.
Second, the Plaintiff in extending financial assistance to the Pali Brothers in 2000
and 2001 could not have relied upon the subject combines as collateral to the extent that
they were subject to New Holland priority security interest in excess of the $67,544.79
that was later refinanced.
Third, as recognized by the trial court in its Memorandum decision, New Holland at
any time could have formally assigned its perfected security interest to the Defendant or
anyone else and the assignment would have extended New Holland's security priority in
the collateral. In this regard, the UCC does not bar one creditor from assigning the
financing of the purchase-money security interest, even if that assignee later refinances
the security interest. In re Schwartz, 52 B.R. 314, 315 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1985(in a
refinance case, the court held that "[t]he fact that a purchase-money security interest was
assigned to one other than the original financer does not cause the security interest to lose
its purchase-money status").
Fourth, New Holland could have refinanced the outstanding balance on the purchase
money security interest debt on the exact terms contained in the Greenline refinancing
agreement, without losing its security priority under the express provisions of Utah Code
Annotated Section 70A-9a-103(6)(c).
Fifth, according to the uncontested affidavit testimony of Defendant witnesses Jay
Pickrel and Melissa Braeger, the Defendant's business practice was to require a first-lien
8

priority before entering into any purchase or refinance arrangement. Consistent with that
business practice, the Defendant conditioned their agreement to refinance the Pali
Brother's outstanding purchase money debt upon the Pali Brothers agreement to accept
and pay the $10 UCC filing fee to preserve the Defendant's purchase money priority
status in the two combines. The Pali Brothers accepted this condition. Pursuant to that
agreement the Defendant did in fact file the UCC-1 purchase-money security interest
within twenty days of the date the debtor and Defendant entered into their Variable
Contract and Loan and Security interest with the Pali Brothers. In accordance with that
agreement, the Defendant throughout this controversy has always claimed a purchasemoney priority.
Given these undisputed legal issues and facts, the only issue remaining is whether,
notwithstanding Utah Code Annotated 70A-9-103(6)(c), Defendant's UCC-1 filing of a
purchase money security interest, and the intent and expectations of the refinancing
parties, the Defendant's refinancing of the purchase money debt somehow transformed
the security interest into a non-preferred security interest? Should the technical fact that
Plaintiffs nonpreferred security interest predated Defendant's refinancing of an earlier
existing purchase-money security interest entitle Plaintiff to a priority windfall it would
not have been otherwise entitled under any other assignment or refinance scenario?
Should form override substance in this case? In answer to this single issue, the
Defendant argues that it is entitled to a purchase-money priority over the Plaintiffs
general security interest under (1) the plain meaning of Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a103(6)(c); (2) the legislative intent of Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-103(6)(c); (3) the
common law justification of the "dual-status" rule adopted by Utah Code Annotated
70A-9a-103(6)(c); (4) the policy reasons underlying Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a9

103(6)(c) and the "dual status" rule; and (5) the rationale underlying the purchase money
priority rules generally.

I. The Plain Meaning of the Applicable Statute Utah Code Annotated Section 70A9a-103(6)(c) provides for the extension of the original purchase money priority to
the Defendant in this case.
Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9a-103(6)(c) expressly applies to the
refinancing transaction between the Pali Brothers as debtors and the Defendant as the
refinancing creditor. Even the trial court in his Memorandum Decision characterized the
subject transaction between the Pali Brothers and the Defendant as a "refinance" of the
original purchase-money debt, but he nonetheless denied the security interest priority
status within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9a-103(6)(c). The court
in essence held that notwithstanding the agreement between the debtor and the
refinancing creditor to extend the purchase-money priority status of the debt through the
refinancing, they botched the priority status afforded by Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a103(6)(c) by filing a UCC-1 purchase money interest rather than obtaining an assignment
from the original purchase-money creditor New Holland. However this overly legalistic
and technical interpretation of the "refinance" provisions is neither supported by the
statute nor consistent with the commonly understood policy that the UCC provisions
should be interpreted liberally to achieve fairness and efficiency. Instead of
distinguishing between an assignment of the purchase money priority status from the
original creditor and an acceptance of the continuation of the priority status by the debtor,
the statute simply provides as follows:
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(6) In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, a purchase-money
security interest does not lose its status as such, even if:
(a) the purchase-money collateral also secures an obligation that is not a
purchase-money obligation;
(b) collateral that is not purchase-money collateral also secures the purchasemoney obligation; or
(c) the purchase-money obligation has been renewed, refinanced, consolidated,
or restructured. (Emphasis added).
The plain meaning of the language contained within Utah Code Annotated 70A9a-103(6)(a) and (c) applies by the statute's terms to the facts of our case. First, the
subject collateral involved non-consumer goods: two combines used in the Pali Brother's
farming business. Second, prior to refinancing New Holland had acquired a purchase
money security interest in the subject collateral. Third, prior to refinancing the
combines, Plaintiff had acquired a security interest in all of the Pali Brother's crops and
equipment that was subordinate to the New Holland purchase money security interest.
Fourth, Defendant's credit transaction by every business practice understanding of the
term constituted a refinance of the outstanding balance of the purchase-money debt.
Fifth, the Defendant conditioned their willingness to refinance the purchase-money
collateral upon their obtaining purchase money priority. Sixth, the debtor and
refinancing creditor intended to extend the purchase money status to the Defendant
Greenline. The debtor even agreed to pay for the UCC filing of Defendant's purchasemoney security interest. Finally, the refinancing creditor did in fact file the purchasemoney notice within the twenty day time period following the refinance transaction
between the debtor and the Defendant Greenline. Accordingly, the statute by its terms
11

expressly applies and controls the priority issue in this case. The statute does not suggest
in any way that the purchase-money status is "transformed" into non-purchase-money
debt simply on the basis of the substitution of the identity of the creditors in the
refinancing transaction.

II. The Legislative intent underlying the Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-103(6)(c)
justifies extension of the original purchase money priority to the facts in this case.
A. The Uniform Commercial Code Amendment UCC 9-103(f)(3) was
intended to extend purchase money status to purchase money debt that is
refinanced.
When redrafting the UCC purchase money provisions in 2000, the drafters were
specifically concerned over the split of authority in refinance cases between
"transformation" and "dual-status" jurisdictions. Under the transformation cases,
refinance "transforms" purchase money debt into non-preferred debt. Under the "dualstatus" rule, the priority status survives refinancing to the extent that the outstanding
balance in the original debt can be "traced" to the refinanced debt. In choosing the "dual
status" alternative, the UCC drafters made it clear that purchase money priority is not
transformed upon refinancing. In accordance with that choice, UCC 9-103(f)(3) was
specifically amended to provide as follows:
(f) [No loss of status of purchase-money security interest in on-consumer-goods
transaction,] In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, a
purchase-money security interest does not lose its status as such even if:
(1) the purchase-money collateral also secures an obligation that is not a
purchase-money obligation;
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(2) collateral that is not purchase-money collateral also secures the purchasemoney obligation; or
(3) the purchase-money obligation has been renewed, refinanced, consolidated, or
restructured.
In the OFFICIAL COMMENT to the amended Uniform Commercial Code 9103(f) provisions, the drafters made it clear that the amendment was intended to adopt
the "dual-status rule" that had been previously recognized by many courts by common
law analysis, and to reject the alternative "transformation theory":
For transactions other than consumer goods transactions, this Article approves
what some cases have called the "dual status" rule, under which a security interest
may be a purchase-money security interest to some extent and a non-purchase
money security interest to some extent. ... Some courts have found this rule to be
explicit or implicit in the words "to the extent," found in former Section 9-107
and continued in subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2). The rule is made explicit in
subsection (f). For non-consumer-goods transactions, this Article rejects the
"transformation" rule adopted by some cases, under which any crosscollateralization, refinancing, or the like destroys the purchase-money status
entirely.
In the OFFICIAL COMMENT to UCC 9-103(f) the drafters further explained:
Subsection (f) buttresses the dual-status rule by making it clear that (in a
transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction) cross-collateralization and
renewals, refinancings, and restructurings do not lose its status as such. The
statutory terms "renewed," "refinanced," and "restructured," are not defined.
Whether the terms encompass a particular transaction depends upon whether,
13

under the particular facts, the purchase-money character of the security interest
fairly can be said to survive. Each term contemplates that an identifiable portion
of the purchase money obligation could be traced to the new obligation resulting
from a renewal refinancing, or restructuring. (Emphasis added).
The OFFICIAL COMMENT, therefore, makes it clear that purchase money
priority turns on the factual issue of whether "an identifiable portion of the purchase
money obligation could be traced to the new obligation." Under the facts of the case, the
outstanding amount of the original purchase-money debt of $67,544.79 can be clearly
traced to the $67,519.85 refinanced debt. Indeed, the whole purpose of the dual status
rule is to protect such instances of refinancing where the outstanding debt is essentially
renewed in the refinancing, rather than significantly changed by substantial add-ons that
make it difficult to even "trace" the original outstanding debt to the refinanced debt.
B. Utah's verbatim adoption of UCC 9-103(f) in Utah Code Annotated 70 A9a-103(6)(c) makes it clear that purchase money priority extends through the
refinance of purchase money obligations.
The Utah legislature, effective July 1, 2001, codified the "refinancing"
provision of UCC 9-103(f)(3) in Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-103(6)(c), thereby
explicitly adopting the"dual status" rule before the Defendant ever refinanced the loan.
By the express terms of the statute, refinancing of purchase-money debt does not destroy
the priority status of the purchase-money debt, to the extent the obligations of the
purchase-money debt can be "traced" to the refinanced debt. While "add-on" debt or
additional obligations included in the refinance are not entitled to purchase-money
priority under the refinance provisions, the amount and terms of the original debt are
extended security priority.
14

The Utah courts have not had an occasion to discuss whether this priority is
somehow "transformed if the refinancing creditor is not identical to the original security
holder. However, the Uniform Commercial Code Section 9-103(f)(3) was explicitly
adopted to resolve a split amongst the courts regarding the extent to which purchasemoney priority is transformed into non-purchase-money priority upon refinancing.

Ilie

plain meaning of the statute, together with the policy justifications of fairness and
efficiency underlj ing the ' ''cli lal status" r \ lie apply \ v ith e qual force and effect regardless
of the identity of the refinancing creditor. A review of the common law meaning and

Code Annotated 70 A-103 (6)(c) to the facts of this case.
rationale of fairness and efficiency underlying the applicable "dual status"
rule, as incorporated into the amended Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-103(6)(c),
apply to the facts of the instant case and justify extending purchase money priority
to the outstanding balance of the original debt that can be traced to the refinanced
debt.
Prior to the UCC amendment on refinancing (UCC 9-106(f)(3)), the courts split
between whether purchase-money priority was transformed upon refinancing (the
"transformation rule") or was preserved to the extent of the outstanding balance on the
purchase money debt (the "dual status rule"). The transformation courts justified their
rule by an o\ erly legalistic reading of the "antecedent debt" proscrir

' '

mrchase

money debt and by the difficulty of tracing the outstanding purchase money debt through

debt" argument by referring to the "to the extent" language contained in the UCC
provisions defining purchase money debt; (2) refuted the practical problem of tracing "
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by limiting the amount of the priority afforded post-refinanced debt to the dollar amount
that could be traced to the outstanding balance at the time of the refinance; and (3)
recommended the "dual status" alternative by emphasizing the fairness and efficiency
served by extending priority status to refinanced debt.
A. Transformation Theory: the transformation theory was adopted by those
courts concerned with the "antecedent debt" language of the UCC in defining
purchase money security and the difficulty in "tracing" the outstanding balance of
the purchase money debt through complex refinancing transactions.
According to courts that adopted the "transformation rule," if a debtor refinances
collateral that is subject to a purchase-money security interest, and any additional debt is
"added-on" then the purchase-money priority is "transformed" into nonpurchase money
status. The courts reasoned (much like Judge Low in this case) that because the purpose
of a refinancing loan is to pay off an "antecedent debt," contrary to the explicit language
defining a purchase money interest under the UCC 9-107, any refinancing necessarily
transforms purchase money debt into antecedent debt, which by definition would not
qualify for purchase money treatment. Matthews v. Transamerica Financial Services,
724 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1984)(per curiam), citing with approval In re Jones, 5 B.R. 655
(Bankr.M.D.N.C. 1980); In re Gillie, 96 B.R. 689 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 1989).
The courts justified the transformation rule on two grounds. Some courts early on
suggested (much like Justice Low in this case) that refinancing does not satisfy the UCC
definition of purchase money because refinancing is not made to enable the creditor to
acquire rights in the collateral (which he already possesses as a consequence of the
original purchase money obligation), but instead is used to pay "antecedent debt." In re
Jones, 5 B.R. 655 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980)). However, this Jones "antecedent
16

debfargument both ignores the "to the extent" language of UCC 107 and ignores the
economic reality "underlying the refinancing transaction

\ 1th 3ugh in techni :al form the •

original debt is cancelled, as a matter of economic reality the outstanding balance is
absorbed, transferred, renewed, or refinanced into the refinanced loan obligation.
Recognizing this economic reality, many of the transformation courts shifted their
justification for the transformation rule awayfromthe legalistic "antecedent debt"
argument, to the argument that refinancing creates a practical difficulty of apportioning
the pre- and post-refinance obligations. If the refinance involves financial "add-ons," in
the sense « •:s.

nterest charged, and/or t h e collateral relied

upon in the refinance, the entire debt is transformed into nonpurchase m o n e y debt unless
ii sitatuterv or i*ni il cm, fnal iiiirrlijiiisin o i s t s for tideniimni! , 1 (he extent U* e l i h h Ihr
outstanding balance o f the original purchase m o n e y security interest can b e differentiated
- *.! -

rust Bank of Alabama, Nat. Ass \ t v Bot •g (;:f rt i, • „ ter ' '

Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d 1240, 1243, rehearing denied, 774 F.2d 1179)(11th Cir.
1985)( "[w]ithout some guideline, legislative or contractual, the court should not be
required to distill from a mass of transactions the extent to which a security interest is
purchase money"... "[u]nless the lender contractually provides some method for
determining the extent to which each item of collateral secures its purchase money, it
effectively gives up its purchase money status"); In re Snipes, 86 B.R 1006 (Bankr.
W.D.Mo. C.D.1988)(discussing the transformation and dual-status rules, and adopting
the transformation approach because the refinancing agreement did not provide for any
method of allocating pa> met its between the origii ml debt at i ;:! tl le coi isolidated debt).
In these transformation jurisdictions, the critical importance of the "method of
allocating" argument (rati lei than tl le "antecedent debt'11 argi lment) is re v ealed
17

h "it i.

those very courts adopt the opposite outcome if the method of allocating payments can be
established by statute or the contract. In re Cersey, 321 B.R. 352, 354 (Bankr. M.D.Ga.
2004)(in a transformation jurisdiction, the court distinguished the transformation rule as
adopted for the Eleventh Circuit in Southtrust to the extent that the contract provided a
coherent basis for allocating payments between the original purchase money debt and the
"add-ons").
B. Dual-Status Theory: the dual status rule was adopted by courts as more
consistent with the "to the extent" language of the UCC that qualifies the antecedent
debt argument and the fairness and efficiency of extending purchase money priority
to refinanced debt.
Many courts rejected both the overly legalistic "antecedent debt" and the "no
method of allocating" justification for the transformation rule in favor of a dual status
rule.

The analysis and explanation given for rejecting the "transformation rule" in

favor of the "dual-status" alternative by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in In re Billings v. Avco Colorado Industrial Bank, 838 F.2d 405 (10th Cir. 1988)
is illustrative. In Billings the debtor had purchased furniture on credit from the "Factory
Outlet Store." The debtor had given the Factory a purchase money security interest in the
furniture, and the Factory had assigned the obligation to another creditor who financed
the transaction. Thereafter, at the request of the debtor, who was having trouble making
the payments (much like the facts of the instant case), the creditor refinanced the
obligation to reduce the monthly installment payments. To effect this transaction, the
parties cancelled the old note (again much like the facts of the instant case), and
substituted a new note and a new security interest (much like Greenline did with the Pali
Brothers). This refinancing note changed the terms of the original security debt by
18

extending the time for repayment (benefitting the debtor much like the facts in the instant
case) and increasing the . • „ . . . • •

i=

•'•

s

instant case where the interest rate change benefitted the debtor as well). The creditor
continued to claim a purchase money interest, but took no additional collate • i "at as secui: it>
(similar to the facts in the instant case). The outstanding balance financed by the
refinancing note remained essentially the same, except the debtor "added-on"additional
fees for credit life, accident and health insurance, a filing fee, and a cash advance to the
debtors (add-on fees that far exceed the minimal add-on fees added by Greenline in the
instant case).
When the debtor in Billings defaulted and filed for bankruptcy, the debtor sought
to avoid (In" i mill of \i

IHTI <W\ (IN1

liiiiiilnir iitnln flic luitliiifffr y t mlr l>v .induing that

the refinance had "transformed" the purchase money status of the credit transaction into a
lie i lpi irehasemonej debt, R eje ctii ig this "transform 1:^1 M

.:" •

• '" -s-

court held that the purchase-money priority was preserved throughout the refinancing
despite the add-ons ana . _.• changes in the debt obligation

I lie (list! ict com iirt affirmed.

The single issue on appeal was whether under the "antecedent debt" argument, the
purchase money security priority had been transformed by refinancing?
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected the
transformation argument and affirmed by adopting the dual status rule. The court
observed that state law related to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) controls the
issue of whether refinancing transforms the purchase money security interest into a nonpurchase money security interest. The court noted that under the then-existing UCC
provisions in Colorado, the UCC omitted any explanation of whether a purchase-money
sec •! iiit) interest 1 : 'Ses its statu is 1 ip oi 11: efinai icing (the omissioi 11 JCC 9 103(f)(3) rectifies
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by stating it does not). In examining the common law response to this omission, the
court observed that some courts, adopting a transformation theory, refused to extend the
purchase money status through refinancing if the refinancing seeks to extend the
purchase money protection beyond the amount of the outstanding balance on the
purchase price. 838 F.2d at 407. The court identified two reasons underlying this
"transformation rule": (1) that purchase money security cannot exist when collateral
secures additional debt or "add ons" and (2) the refinancing transaction creates a new
loan to pay off an "antecedent debt," The court rejected both justifications for denying
continued priority status:
The problem with the first rationale ... is that it ignores the precise wording of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Section 9-107 of the U.C.C. provides that a security
interest is a purchase money security interest ""to the extent' that the loan enables
the debtor to purchase new property." This language would be meaningless if an
obligation could never be considered only partly a purchase money debt.
The problem with the second rationale of the transformation rule is ... it ignores
the possibility that the refinancing merely renewed the debt, rather than creating
new debt. 838 F2d 405, 408.
Citing substantial authority, the court rejected the "transformation" theory and
held that "refinancing does not automatically transform a purchase money security
interest." Id. At 409. In place of the "transformation rule" the court justified adopting the
alternate "dual status rule" because it better comports with the "to the extent" language of
the UCC and serves the important policy considerations of fairness and efficiency that
are ignored by the "transformation rule." The court explained: "The basic problem with
the automatic 'transformation' rule is that it discourages creditors who have purchase
20

money security interests from helping their debtors work out of financial problems
without bankruptcy and -,...** .. . • endering the collateral securing the (let t """ I :!! at : 109
Applied to the facts of that case (and also relevant to the instant case), the Court
observed: "The instant case is an excellent example. These debtors apparently needed
lower monthly payments on their debt. In a 'transformation' jurisdiction the creditor
could not cooperate without giving up its right to protect its security if debtors filed
bankruptcy." Id. At 409.
The Court further noted that a change in interest rate in a refinancing transaction
"doesn.

. *:

J

'• • ..•^-- • l obligation is extinguished "Id at 409 n. 4. ' I he

- ••

Court added that the "transformation" rule "jumbles priorities among creditors." Id. At
JI

i|iMlmg (ii/hit ( Id I1 I" il • 11-v
| he ' , it in irfii'iiir 1 , \u U thai tin purchase-

money status had been extinguished as a consequence of the refinancing, commented:
"'"'"W1 hen a deb secured b) a pi irehase i i loney secur it) Ii iterest is refinai ice cl, and the
identical collateral remains as security for the refinanced debt, then neither the debt nor
the security has changed its essential character." The court also noted in c . i (relevant
to the instant case) that a holder of a PMSI may assign or transfer its security interest to a
third party unrelated to the pxirchase without losing its preferred status. 83-8 F.2d at 406.
Many other courts came to the same conclusion for the same reasons. For
example, In re Schwartz, 52 B.R. 314, 316 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1985) the court held that
even a novation of a purchase money security interest does not destroy its purchase
money status when it is refinanced. In Schwartz the debtors purchased certain goods and
granted the seller a pi irehase n lonejJ security interest • * l v

</

!

**

- -?

security interest was assigned to a new creditor. The new creditor later refinanced the
loan "whereby ne^

•

. were generated, a i le1 > s = z\ n it) agre -ei :i i mt \ as
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signed and 'fresh cash' given to the debtors. By this act of refinancing the parties
intended a novation of the earlier loan contract by the new one." 52 B.R. at 314.
Nonetheless, the court held that under the dual-status rule the purchase-money priority
had been preserved to the extent of the outstanding balance at the time of the refinance.
The court explained: "Even granting that a novation has been implemented to cancel the
original loan document creating the purchase-money security agreement, such a novation
does not nullify the purchase money aspect of the original transaction." 52 B.R. at 31617.
Similarly, in In re Krueger, 172 B.R. 572 (N.D.Ohio 1994), the issue was whether
a refinancing of a purchase-money debt, which included the debtor receiving an
additional $1000, extinguished the purchase-money status of the original outstanding
balance. In rejecting this transformation result, the court held that "[t]he fact that the
Refinancing included finance charges incurred by the Debtors on the Loan, provided for
longer term of repayment than the Loan, and provided for increased monthly payments
does not represent strong support for the Debtor's position that the Refinancing
extinguished [creditor's] purchase money security interest." (172 B.R. 574). In
recognizing the purchase-money priority for the amount of the original debt, the court
found the intent of the debtor and creditor critical (the same intent reflected in the
refinancing documents in this case): "in view of the fact that the Refinancing specifically
contemplated [the creditor's] retention of a security interest in the Furniture, the Court
cannot conclude that the parties intended to extinguish [the creditor's] purchase money
security interest in the Furniture." 172 B.R. at 575. Accordingly, the court held:
"Therefore, [the creditor's] security interest retains its purchase money character to the

22

extent of

the payoff balance of the Loan at the time of the Refinancing less subsequent

payments made by the Debtors/M72B.R. at 574
The court in In re Short, 170 B.R. 128 (S.D.I11.1994) similarly relied upon the
intent of the debtor and the refinancing creditor in adopting the "dual-status rule" for a
refinanced purchase-money security interest. There the court held that the degree of
financial change in the underlying obligation determines whether the PMSI status
continues following refinance. 170 B R at 13< \

In response to the argument (also

posed in this case by Judge Low) that refinanced debt fits within the language of
"antecedent debt'* pi oscribed for purchase-monej debt I mdei th 3 I JCC the zoui t foi iiid
the "to the extent" language of UCC 9-107 determinative:
Asecurif'y mleresf is J "[UIK'II i \ iiiumo, Mitiiil, ml \ 4' to the cxw ni fLtl il i<
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price;
or (b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in ... collateral... (i 70 1 K. at 132).
According to the court in Short, the "to the extent" language of 9 10 7 is more
compatible with the "dual-status rule" than the "transformation rule" "to the extent" that
purchase money priority is extended only to the amount of the outstanding balance of the
original purchase money debt:
the "dual-status rule" "is premised on the language of section 9-107, which
provides that a lien is a purchase money security interest "to the extent" that it is
taken to secure the purchase price of collateral. Accordingly, the purchase money
security interest ta*

•-

'

v;

m
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balance remaining unpaid on the original purchase money loan. See Russell v.
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Associates Financial Services Co. (In re Russell), 29 B.R. 270, 273-74 (Bankr.W.D.
Okl.l983).(170B.R.atl33).
The court identified the "tracing" problem as the key challenge for implementing
the dual status rule:
The difficulty with the dual status rule lies in determining the extent of the
purchase money interest remaining after refinancing.... When a purchase money
loan has been consolidated with nonpurchase money debt and payments have
ensued, some method of applying payments between the purchase money and
nonpurchase money portions of the refinanced loan is necessary so that the
purchase money collateral secures only its own price and does not remain as
collateral for the entire obligation.
After weighing the strengths of the dual status rule against the single "tracing"
problem associated with the transformation rule, the court adopted the dual status
alternative:
the dual status rule more closely adheres to the statutory language of Section 9107 while effecting the policy behind [the priority rules]. The "to the extent"
language of 9-107 clearly contemplates that a loan maybe partially purchase
money and partially nonpurchase money, depending on the circumstances of its
creation. 170 B.R. at 134.
The court in Geist v. Converse County Bank, 79 B.R. 939 (D.Wyo. 1987) also
adopted the dual status rule and applied it to a creditor's refinancing of collateral. The
court criticized the transformation rule as overly legalistic and contrary to the language of
theUCC:
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Courts accepting the transformation rule reason that refinancing transforms a
purchase money security interest into an ordinary one because the refinancing
does not enable the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral. This reasoning,
however, not only exalts form over substance, but moreover ignores the preamble
to U.C.C. Section 9-107 ... which states that a security interest is a purchase
money security interest "to the extent" that it si taken by one making a loan that
enables a debtor to acquire rights in the collateral. 79 B.R. at 942.
In adopting the dual status rule, the court explained: "[although the refinancing

purchase money security interest after refinancing is nevertheless preserved to the extent
that the balance remainir

i. is transfer red t 3 the i € new all, nc te ' " Id

Again in In re Hill, 226 B.R. 284 (Bankr.Ct. 1998), the bankruptcy court
fc lie • A eel the "" 'di lal status" i ule It i i" • " \ * II the debtor purchased certain items • : f household
goods and furnishings. The debtor financed the purchase by giving to the seller a
promissory note and a security interest. That note and security interest were then
assigned to Norwest (relevant to the economic reality, if not formal assignment, in the
instant case). Later Norwest (a nonpurchase money creditor) refinanced the loan. In the
refinance Norwest advanced $500 in additional funds and the debtor gave additional
collateral consisting of additional items of household goods. When the bankruptcy was
filed the debtor sought to avoid the security interest by Norwest by arguing that the addons had transformed the purchase money debt into nonpurchase money debt. In rejecting

re Billings v. Avco Colorado Industrial Bank, 838 F.2d 405 (10th Cir. 1988).
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Many bankruptcy courts, district courts, and the United States Courts of Appeal
for the Third, Eighth, and Tenth circuits adopted a "dual status rule" for the refinance of
purchase-money security interests as more consistent with both the language of the UCC,
and the principles of fairness and efficiency underlying the UCC. Pristas v. Landus of
Plymouth, Inc., 742 F.2d 797, 800-01 (3rd Cir. 1984)(in a refinancing case the court
observed that consolidating several loans did not destroy the purchase-money character
of a security interest and explained that "the "transformation rule' is misguided because it
fails to consider the import of the critical language defining purchase money in section 9107 - 'to the extent.' By overlooking that phrase, the 'transformation' courts adopt an
unduly narrow view of the purchase-money device. Their reasoning is inconsistent with
the Commercial Code, which gives favored treatment to those financing arrangements on
the theory that they are beneficial both to buyers and sellers"); In re Hemingson, 84 B.R.
604 (Bankr. D.Minn. 1988)(holding that under Minnesota law the refinancing of a
purchase money loan of farm equipment did not destroy the "purchase money" character
of the original debt: "This court accepts the Mual status' rule because it gives credence to
the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 9-107 states that a security interest is a purchase
money security interest to the extent that it is taken by one making a loan that enables a
debtor to acquire rights in the collateral. The courts that follow the transformation rule
merely exalt form over substance"); Bond's Jewelers, Inc. V. Linklater (In re Linklater),
48 B.R. 916 (Bankr. D.Nev. 1985)(holding that a purchase money security in jewelry was
not lost when the perfected purchase money security interest was consolidated with a
subsequent retail installment contract and explaining: "If the allocation can be made, the
purchase money security interest will remain intact to the extent that the collateral
continues to secure its own price. Purchase money security interests that secure other
26

goods will be deemed nonpurchase money only to the extent that they secure the other

transformation rule, in part, because its effect is to "jumble priorities among creditors,
and to defeat the very reason for having a priority system'' ); 1 n re Russell .

h

), •

274 (Bankr.W.D.Okl.l983)(in denying that a refinanced and consolidated loan that had
been marked "P/\1DU was thereby transformed into nonpurchase money debt, the court
reasoned "[t]he only way 'to the extent' [of UCC 9-107] can be given meaning is to find
that a secured debt may be split into two parts, a purchase money part constituting so
much of the debt as represents the price of the collateral and a nonpi irehase money part
constituting ^add on' debt"); In re Parsley, 104 B.R. 72, 74 (Bankr.S.D.Ind.l988)(in
followin • 'V* .!••

' .* -
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security interest to the extent that the debtor has never paid the purchase price"); In re
Ionosphere Clubs, In : , 123 IE! R 1,6 6, 1 / 1 (I991)(i dentifyii ig tl: le dual stati is i ule as the
modern trend and explaining that "[u]nder [the dual-status] approach, the relevant
cp' M
.>

ii

.

i interest in the collateral as security for

the purchase price obligation, not whether the purchased property also serves or will
serve as collateral for other debts of the purchaser").
C. The Trial Court Misinterpreted the Tracing Issue in Determining
Whether a Refinanced Purchase-Money Security Interest is Entitled to Preserve the
Original Purchase-money Status.
The trial court in his Memorandum decision held that Defendant's priority claim
could not succeed under the statute because the amount it efin : u iced b> the E> sfendant
could not be "traced" to the outstanding balance of the original purchase-money security

interest as required by Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-103(6)(c). However, the court's
decision clearly misinterprets the tracing requirement under the statute.
In the OFFICIAL COMMENT to the amended refinancing provision, the UCC
drafters discussed the "tracing" issue as it related to comparing the outstanding balance
of the original purchase money debt with the amount of the debt refinanced, rather
comparing a continuity of the original UCC filing document and any successive
assignments. Contrary to the trial court's formalistic suggestion that the original UCC-1
filing must be traced to the re-financed UCC filing through a formal assignment
document, the "tracing" the UCC drafters clearly had in mind involves correlating the
amount of the outstanding purchase-money debt to the refinanced debt. The OFFICIAL
COMMENT that the court misinterprets by its focus on tracing the UCC filing status is
the following:
Whether the terms [of the refinancing] encompass a particular transaction
depends upon whether, under the particular facts, the purchase-money character
of the security interest fairly can be said to survive. Each term contemplates that
an identifiable portion of the purchase money obligation could be traced to the
new obligation resulting from a renewal refinancing, or restructuring. (Emphasis
added).
In his Memorandum Decision when the court found that the refinanced debt
cannot be "traced" to the original purchase money debt, the court ignored the obvious
economic reality that "an identifiable portion of the purchase money obligation could be
traced to the new obligation resulting from a renewal, refinancing, or restructuring."
Instead of focusing on the amount of the debt, the key tracing issue in all the refinancing
cases, the court relied exclusively upon formally tracing UCC filing documents: asking
28

only whether the Defendant had received from the prior creditor New Holland a formal
I

i^;..... ,-i •. •

o vAUM,} :\ . J L. n us misinterpretation

of "tracing" requirement makes no sense if one examines the issues discussed in the
context of the respective "transformation" and the "dual-status" cases. In all of these
cases the courts in discussing the issue of "tracing" ask whether the outstanding dollar
balance of the original purchase money obligation can be traced to the dollar amount
contained in the more complex refinancing or consolidation transacts *

•; -

significant additional debt is added, the collateral is substantially changed, the terms of
the financing significantly are altered to the disadva^tn^ .

*h*h

difficult to identify the original purchase-money debt in the final terms of the refinance.

identical with or more favorable to the debtor, then consistent with the OFFICIAL
COMMENT t :> the amended pro isic n , it is easy to "trace" an "identifiable portion of the
purchase money obligation ... to the new obligation resulting from ... refinancing."
I

udtiii^ v»i pre-refinancing and post-refinancing

debt is pellucidly clear, notwithstanding the court's confused suggestion to the contrary.
1

i the original purchase-money obligation owing New Holland for the

combines was $67, 654.79. The Defendant Greenline refinanced essentially the same
amount, "adding on" only;, ,

ling fee to preserve the purchase-money status,

and a $ 150 origination fee. The additional amount identified by the court i i I lis
Memorandum Decision for the "finance costs" of $10,626,43 were actually less than the
financing costs that would have been owiii^, under llir New 11< 11,i I J pui m II.J * ino-nev
debt, because the Defendant Greeline reduced the interest rate on the loan and
consequently

:
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favorably to the outstanding purchase-money obligation owing to New Holland at the
time of the refinance.
The court's confusion over the "tracing" issue contributed to the court's
confusion over whether the debtor and the Defendant "intended" to continue the
purchase-money status of the "traced" balance through the refinancing. As a
consequence, the court erred in holding as irrelevant on the issue of whether the
Defendant and the debtor intended to preserve the purchase-money status, the following
facts (which were part of the record and which the court had to interpret in favor of the
nonmoving party in the hearing for summary judgment):(l) the Defendant conditioned
the refinancing of the New Holland debt upon the Pali Brothers accepting the Defendant
as a substitute purchase-money creditor; (2) the Defendant memorialized this agreement
on the issue of preservation of priority by including $10 cost for the UCC filing as one of
only two "add-ons" included in the refinancing documents (the other fee was $150 for an
origination fee); (3) the Defendant filed the new purchase-money UCC filing within
twenty days of the refinance, as required by the UCC filing requirements; and (4) the
Defendant treated the security interest as having purchase-money priority throughout the
term of the loan and throughout the default dispute. Because the court held that the only
way the prior security interest could be "traced" to the refinancing is through a formal
UCC assignment (which the court believed acknowledged would have been outcome
determinative to the priority issue), the court misconstrued the "tracing" issue underlying
Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9a-103(6)(c) and disregarded the clear intent of the
parties to continue the purchase money status through the refinance.
According to the common law rationale for requiring tracing, the outstanding
purchase money debt should receive continued purchase-money status that can be traced
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to the outstanding balance at the time of the refinance and any "add-ons" should receive
lumniudiiist (Homey sLilus Priority should be preserved for the outstanding purchase
money debt throughout refinancing "to the extent" the outstanding balance wide?
purchase money debt can be "traced" to the refinanced amount. Under the tracing rule, if
a refinancing creditor "adds-on" additional de<

••**"•

standing obligation of the debtor, then the purchase money status is preserved only "to
the extent" that it can be traced
The UCC adoption of 9-103 (f)(3) and the Utah adoption of the verbatim
provisioi

•

-• •

*

K.-.O^

must be understood and

applied in the context of the dual-status cases that provide the policy justification for the
dinf -littiis ink, (!L- pnunly >l,ilu t *|H>MI*I I M; retained in this case because the prerefinancing debt can be traced to the post-refinancing debt and extension of priority
si

policy considerations of fairness and efficiency.

IV. The policy justifications of fairness and efficiency underlying I Hnh I YMIC
Annotated Section 70A-9-103(6)(c) argue in favor of extending purchase money
priority to the refinanced debt in this case.
Both the dual status cases and UCC commentators have justified extending
purchase money priority in those instances vvluic principles nl lainicss ,nul I'lliciency
argue in favor of extending the priority. According to the fairness justification, if a
general security interest attaches a, On \hv oiipnttl pi.idi.ise n i n a ) seainl 1

Iciest

existed, there is no change to the creditor's security status upon refinancing. Therefore, it
would not be

"

archase money priority to the

refinanced debt, but it would be unfair to the refinancing creditor to lose the priority
unancing the general security interest holder has
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available the exact same collateral available upon default as they had available when the
loan was originally made. (Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 Yale L.J. 1143,1167-75 (1979); Jackson & Kronman, A Plea for
the Financing Buyer, 85 Yale L.J. 1, 6-7 (1975); Lacy, Conflicting Security Interests in
Inventory and Proceeds under the Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
41 S.C.L.Rev. 247, 276-78 (1990); Nickles, Setting Farmers Free: Right in the
UnintendedAnomalyofU.C.C. Section 9-312(2), 71 Minn. L.Rev. 1135,1171-75
(1987).
For example, in In re Halprin, 280 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir. 1960), in granting a later
acquired purchase money priority over a tax lien, the court observed:
such a [purchase money] lender as Commercial has enriched the taxpayer's estate
by the amount loaned to the taxpayer. For this reason it is not unreasonable to
allow it a corresponding security interest in the fruit of the borrowed money, with
the government relegated to the borrowing taxpayer's net after the lender is
reimbursed. The government has suffered no diminution of the assets which were
available to satisfy its tax claim before the loan. 280 F2d at 410.
The result in the instant case should be the same for the same reasons. Greenline
enriched the debtor's estate by the amount loaned to refinance the purchase money debt
for which the debtor was in default. If the Plaintiff is relegated to receiving the debtor's
net after the Defendant Greenline is reimbursed (the dual-status result and the result
required by Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9a-103(6)(c), the Plaintiff will have
suffered "no diminution of the assets which were available to satisfy its [general security
interest] claim before the loan." The Plaintiff can not argue that it has been treated
unfairly in being unable to benefit from a financial contribution it neither created nor
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relied upon in making its loans. Fairness does not require a windfall to the Plaintiff
simply because Ihc IJulcinJitiil did not obtain a formal assignment of New Holland's prior
purchase money status.
Extending priority status to the refinanced debt is not only fair it is also efficient.
Encouraging refinancing by extending priority status in »111

111'11111 111 iI s 1.1111 min n I >111111 c v

is efficient in encouraging refinancing where the debtor finds it expedient for a variety of
reasons. Extending purchase money statu\

IIIITMI^II IVIMKIIV IIIJL« saves

rflii'i ncy in

encouraging subsequent lenders to extend credit and to prevent earlier lenders from
frustrating a borrower's attemn

.:...••

Nickles at 1173. Just as allowing later acquired purchase money interests to take priority
over floating lie • .*!•:.'•

,

;

.

nanuag prevents a monopoly in

the debtor's access to credit. Jackson and Kronman, Secured Financing at 1167. In this
s^i'

^

;[•. • : v dnancing promotes competition among creditors

and reduces transaction costs to debtors, without unfairly imposing a penalty on existing
cmhlrr," Vi

IN

ni I II n.

IUHSC oil

than they were prior to refinancing. Nickles at .1173-

74.
These policy considerations of fairness and efficiency make sense as applied to
the facts of the instant case. At the time of the refinance, the Pali Brothers ^ > *?•.•••.. i y
iL

iuent in their payments to New Holland Credit. New Holland Credit could have

immediately repossessed the two combines and the Plaintiff w nhl lv,i\c Ivul i rh nin c nl
recovering anything from the productive capacity of the combines. If the refinancing
rule were as Plaintiff suggests, 11\ (IW. ^

•

'

Greenline would

not work with the debtor in an attempt to stave off bankruptcy by delaying immediate
payment obligatic.-* - \-.-- >-> •• !-

^ payments can be made at a lower
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monthly payment schedule, or lowering interest rates. Consequently, not only would
the debtor be disadvantaged, the general secured creditors would also lose the advantage
of a temporary credit reprieve. The initial purchase-money creditor would have to
enforce strictly the terms of the purchase-money security interest to avoid loss of the
purchase-money priority status. Everyone would be disadvantaged with no apparent gain
to anyone. By assisting the debtor to stay in business through refinancing, the debtor has
an increased the business opportunity of the debtor to recover financially with no
increased exposure to anyone.
V. The purposes and policies underlying the definition of purchase money security
interests under Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-324 also justify extension of the
original purchase money priority.
Even without the benefit of either the common law dual status rule or the
specific statutory reference to refinance under Utah Code annotated Section 70A-9a103(6)(c) the refinancing transaction in this case fits within the purposes and policies
underlying the statutory definition of a purchase money security interest. Under Utah
Code annotated 70A-9a-103(l)(b), "'purchase-money obligation' means an obligation of
an obligor incurred as all or part of the price of the collateral or for value given to enable
the debtor to acquire rights in the use of the collateral if the value is in fact so used, "
(Emphasis added). Utah Code annotated Section 70A-9a-103(2) further provides: "A
security interest in goods is a purchase-money security interest: (a) to the extent that the
goods are purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest..."
Apart from the dual status "to the extent" argument discussed above, under any
interpretation of the refinancing in this case, the Defendant, as part of the refinance
transaction, advanced $67,544.79 to New Holland "to enable the debtor to acquire rights
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in the use of the collateral is the value is in fact so used." By making the refinancing
i«i nil, llio IJdeiuhiil enabled"' the debtor Pali Brothers to both avoid an impending
default and to acquire rights in the use of the collateral (the combine**
money financed was in fact used for that very purpose, extending the debtor's use of the
combines another year. Without the refinance the <M^i i "

I<I ii M **, <k1liu>i'ied o"t Ne^

Holland's loan and would have lost the use of the combines. Moreover, Defendant's
claim of priority through the refinance < -v * •-

•

o goods are

purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest."
Grant Gilmo -^ w1i • i > I' 1111 • p r n\»' 11>111 < 111

• .i • -

' , suggested that the

"enabling" requirement for purchase money status should not be rigidly interpreted.
Grant Gilme

<

.

,,. - ; j j j . •

* :->63). He

asserted that if a loan transaction appears to be "closely allied" to the purchase
transiiffjiti'iii 11 IIIIIII1. '.In mill

IIIIHIII

iliai a rivlSl has been created. Gilmoreat 1374. T h e U C C

commentators White and Summers, following Gilmore, observe that w 111 l< 11 i • 1 If *
I 11 u 11 c guidance as to how broadly the requirement "to enable the debtor acquire
rights in or the use of collateral," should be interpreted thev ml n ii'minmeinl Hi

1

requirement should be liberally construed:
"Ifthe loan transaction appears to be close! \ ?»lliul In (In pun base Iriin^ulmn,
that should suffice. The evidence intent of paragraph (b) is to free the purchasemoney concept from artificial limit-.ilions; nj',1 1 • idhcreiu'e U\ p.ulK.ul.11 formalities
in sequences should not be required." 4 White and Summers,Uniform
Commercial Code [4lfl t<] \w^\

<

Interests in Personal Property 782 (1965).
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Accordingly, in interpreting the requirement that "the creditor give value to
enable the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral," the courts should liberally consider
whether the loan was "to enable" a debtor to acquire use in the subject collateral and
whether the value given was in fact used for that purpose. Ingram v. Ozard Prod. Credit
Ass % 468 F.2d 564, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1972); In re McHenry, 71 B.R. 60, 64 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1987); In re Dillon, 18 B.R. 252, 254 (Bankr.E.D.Cal. 1982).
For example, the court in In re Enterprises Industries, Inc. v. Sutherland Press,
259 B.R. 163 (Bankr.N.D. Calif. 2001) liberally construed the "enabling" requirement as
applied to a third party creditor's advancement of financing. In Sutherland the debtor
entered into an initial purchase money security interest for the purchase of a press, but
the debtor later required additional financing from a separate third party financier to
obtain possession of and title to the press. In connection with this later transaction, the
debtor executed a purchase order for a press from the seller and first creditor. Although
the purchase agreement required the filing of a UCC -1 purchase money security interest,
the seller-creditor delayed making the filing. Both parties agreed that this seller-creditor
acquired an enforceable purchase money security interest in the unpaid balance of the
press under 9-107(a) of the UCC.
However, before the debtor could obtain possession of the press, the debtor
obtained financing from a third party fiancier who filed an earlier UCC-1 financing
statement on the same collateral. The initial purchase-money seller of the press argued
that a debtor can only acquire rights in collateral one time during a purchase transaction,
effectively precluding a second lender from acquiring a purchase money security interest
in the same collateral. Rejecting this argument, the court held that the respective
purchase money creditor acquired "different "rights' in the press at each successive
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stage." The court held that the second creditor also qualified as a purchase money
security interest because the second creditor under U C C 9-107(b) "enable[d] the debtor
[to] acquire rights in or the use of collateral." This result lilvi.illy rniislnici the
"enabling" provisions and suggests a similar result in the instant case.
Much like the payments in Si.•''.. Av,

'

..

.. obtaining

possession of and title to the press," the money advanced by Greenline enabled the debtor
to retain possession

i ne transaction extended

a second level of purchase money status to the second purchase money security holder,
just as the set\-i^ 1 • • * > •

•,

Lx

icnded purchase money status to a second

creditor. Once Greenline had completed the purchase from New Holland, it refinanced
tin I umbiik's K* mi
Sutherland

11

tic outstanding balance, just as the second creditor in

paid the outstanding balance necessary for the creditor to obtain possession.

Grrpiiii,|iii„r " nj'Iiiiaiiet" enabled the debtor to "acquire rights in or the use of collateral,"
that they would have otherwise not been entitled to

1111m 11 r f, n 111

Similarly, the court liberally construed the "to enable" U C C language in General
Electric Capital Commercial Automotive

*'

n.*'-

,

.

^

..JU vO>. 246 A.D.2d 41 (New York. App. 1998). In General Electric a financier
held a blanket lien on the debtor's invmtr f

nn In \\\ v tin PI liiililTliekl on till ul I he Tali

Brother's existing and after-acquired property. Later the debtor signed a second security
agreement with a new creditor to (iiiiim <• llu- <M>lnr',. in\ t/uh i

After the second

security agreement had been signed, the debtor purchased two Mercedes automobiles, for
which the • -

:

uiu.ut a specific agreement requiring

the reimbursement. The court observed that "many courts have been reluctant
\\vM i

|HIR*(KISC

tnoii" * •euiii"'1, interest has been created where, as here, title to and

possession of the merchandise have passed to the debtor before the loan is advanced."
Citing Grant Gilmore, the court explained that then existing "UCC 9-107(b) was enacted
at least in part to liberalize the rather rigid traditional rules, e.g., regarding the
circumstances under which purchase money secured status could be obtained by a
creditor who enables a debtor to acquire new inventory (see, Gilmore, The Purchase
Money Priority, 76 Harv. L.Rev. 1333, at 1373 [1963])." 675 N.Y.S.2d at 631. Agreeing
with Gilmore, the court observed: "the evident intent of paragraph (b) is to free the
purchase money concept form artificial limitations; rigid adherence to particular
formalities and sequences should not be required." Id. at 631. In answering how a
transaction is to be evaluated to determine if it is sufficiently "closely allied" to the
purchase transaction to justify extending purchase money status, the court held that the
intent of the debtor and creditor is controlling transaction. Id. at 632.
Also, in ThetMah & Assoc, V. First Bank of N.D., 336N.W.2d 134,138 (N.D.
1983), the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a bank created a PMSI when its
advance of a binding commitment to issue funds enabled the debtor to enter into an
equipment lease with a third party. Thet Mah, at 138. Given the fact that the debtor
would have been unable to enter into the equipment lease without the binding
commitment, the "enabling" requirement was met. Id.
The results in the above "enabling" cases are also consistent with the rule
recognized by United States Supreme Court authority in tax lien areas where a later
advancement of purchase-money financing provides a priority for the loan even against a
pre-existing lien on after-acquired property. In such cases the Court has stated: "a
security interest based on the extension of purchase money defeats a previously filed
federal tax lien." Slodovv, United States, 436 U.S. 238 (1978). According to the
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Supreme Court, "the [Internal Revenue] Code and established decisional principles
subordinate the tax lien, to certain perfected security interest in ... collateral which is
subject to a purchase-money mortgage regardless of whetlic "In1 w m i o n ! »vas entered
imo heiore or after the filing of the tax lien." Slodov, 436 U.S. at 257-58. The Court
explained that "[t]he purchase-money mortgage pnnufi, nSl h y at" |u<n I ecognition that
the mortgagee's interest merely reflects his contribution of property to the taxpayer's
estate and therefore does noi pioindn " \ lvAlt

v« I"«

M\:

pnui in nine,

.WIJI^V

4 'So U.S.

at258n.23.

CONCLUSION
Beca*

" \ .v,

.. i. isc money refinancing of the New Holland original

purchase money establishes a security priority in favor of Defendants, us i nutter i
moi.n11nj; nl I I'liili "I"cult: Annotated Section 70A-9a-103(6)(c), the legislative intent
underlying the statute, the common law interpretati*
IIJHnig

s >!

requirement, the policy justifications of fairness and efficiency, and the language

and liberal justification for purchase money * 'M <rn.«

.giantingof

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should be overruled and the case remanded for
further proceedings consistent with recogm/w.i. I VrcnvL

the refinanced

debt that can be effectively traced to the original purchase money debt.
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